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A CRITIQUE OF THE
REPORT OF THE CANON
LAW SOCIETY OF AMERICA
ON DUE PROCESS'
MARTIN J. MCMANUS*

THE REPORT

of the Canon Law Society of America (CLSA) to the
National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB) on due process
was published by the NCCB in April 1970. The Report was approved
by the CLSA in October 1969 and by the NCCB in November 1969.
This critique will examine the Report in detail, pointing out its attributes
and deficiencies.
IN GENERAL

The first objection to the Report is that it did not fulfill the purpose
of its existence which was to provide specific suggestions to the NCCB
as to how due process may be incorporated into canon law. Specific
suggestions were offered in the appendices as to how conciliation and
arbitration could be established. Conciliation and arbitration, however,
are not due process. Appendix C also gave specific suggestions as to how
administrative discretion should be structured. This is a laudable end,
but it is not due process. It is a result of due process. Properly structured
administrative discretion can only be accomplished by establishing sub-

t The Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Due Process to the Canon Law Society
of America is reprinted in full in 15 CATH. LAw. 278 (1969). All citations herein
are to that edition of the Report.
* A.B., John Carroll University, 1939; LL.B., Georgetown University, 1942; LL.M.,
University of Southern California, 1946; J.S.D., New York University, 1961; J.C.B.,
Catholic University, 1964; J.C.L., J.C.D., Pontifical University of the Lateran, 1965;
S.T.L., Pontifical Urbanian University, 1966; S.T.D., Pontifical Angelicum University, 1967.
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stantive and procedural due process. To
the extent that the Report sought this, it
sought due process. However, for some
unfathomable reason it failed to acknowledge this. Consequently, the measures suggested under the title of "preventive steps"
were a type of dwarfed and truncated due
process but not true due process because
certain essential elements were lacking.
The second objection to the Report is
that it devoted very little space to the subject of the Report, due process, but gave
a disproportional amount of attention to
other matters. The Report consists of
thirty-eight pages. The appendices account
for approximately one-half of the Report.
Only six pages, five to eleven, dealt with
due process. The Report should have been
limited to six pages or else the title should
have been changed to indicate its true
scope. The rest of the Report consisting of
thirty pages, by far the greater part, dealt
with conciliation, arbitration, and administrative discretion. None of these are due
process. They are procedures for participatory government of a judicial nature. Unless due process is required in these procedures, they may well violate due process.
The Report did not make this requirement.
Even if they were within the scope of the
title, there was no need to give such detailed procedures in the appendices indicat.
ing how they could be established. These
concepts have been well-defined in law. It
was not necessary for the ad hoc committee
to rediscover the wheel in this respect. For
forty years the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service has been working with
these procedures. This experience is available to the Church if desired. Therefore,
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these appendices were not only immaterial
to the scope of the work, they were completely unnecessary, even if they had been
material. The greatest error, however, that
the committee made in this regard was its
failure to demand due process in these procedures of participatory government if they
were adopted by the Church.
The committee made another error in
this connection, because it did not separate
the issue as to whether these procedures
should be adopted from the issue as to how
they should be implemented, if adopted.
There is no question that these procedures
should be adopted. There is grave doubt,
however, as to whether the techniques of
implementing them as suggested by the Report and outlined in the appendices are valid
if due process is to be secured. Employing
an independent group of mediators and arbitrators having no connection with the
Church would be a much simpler procedure. Such a method of securing these
services would avoid the problem of separation of powers. It is not certain that
the method of the Report could. Failure
to secure separation of powers would in
itself violate due process. Since the Report
does not clearly distinguish between due
process on one hand, and conciliation and
arbitration on the other, considerable confusion results. In fact, the Report equates
due process with conciliation and arbitration. This error is compounded by the
Report's failure to demand due process in
all conciliation and arbitration proceedings.
Under the title Structuring Administrative Discretion, the Report sought substantive and procedural due process in
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administrative proceedings without, however, calling it by its proper name.1 It is
difficult to see why the ad hoc committee
did this, particularly in a Report with this
title. Even though many more injustices
might have been committed in administrative proceedings than in other judicial
proceedings, as the Report contends, it is
also difficult to understand why the committee limited its demand for reforms to
administrative proceedings. Administrative
proceedings should be restructured to provide justice. This can best be done by
requiring substantive and procedural due
process.
The third objection to the Report is
that, although it dealt with a legal subject,
it is not written in a precise legal style,
using legal terminology and employing
legal reasoning and precedents. Even if
otherwise accurate, this fact in itself would
constitute a serious flaw for this type of
Report.
The fourth objection to the Report is
that it contains many errors. These occur
in its statements on the law, in its statements on the law of due process, in its
statements on the law of rights, duties,
and authority.
LAW

The Report states that "[r]ights without
legal safeguards, both preventive and by
way of effective recourse are often meaningless. ''2 In American law, a right does
not exist unless it has an effective remedy.

1 15 CATH. LAW. at 291-92.
2 Id. at 281.

There is no right without a remedy. Consequently, the above quoted statement is
erroneous.
In the following sentence, the Report
continues: "It is the noblest service of law
to afford effective safeguards for the protection of rights, and, where rights have
been violated, to afford effective means for
their prompt restoration."'3 The above errs
in understatement. The protection of rights
is not merely the noblest service of law, it
is the basic reason for its existence.
The following incredible statement then
appears: "Phrased in abstract terms, the
question whether there ought to be 'due
process' in the Church answers itself since
everyone is obviously entitled to whatever
process is 'due.' "'I The above statement
is, of course, a truism. It assumes incorrectly that the definition of the legal term
"due process" is equal to the sum of the
definition of the two words "due" and
"process." This is completely erroneous.
Due process is a well-defined legal term
in the law of the United States. Due
process does not exist in the law of the
Church at the present time. Consequently,
if this position were followed, due process
would receive no further consideration
simply because it is not "due" now. That
is not the issue, however. The issue is
whether a legally defined concept known
as due process should be incorporated into
canon law.
The Report recognizes the validity of
this position when it says:

3Id.
4 Id.
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The question becomes real only when specific content is given to the expression
"due process" so that what is asked is
whether certain specific substantive and
procedural protections are due, in given
sets of circumstances, in order that the
rights of persons involved be adequately
safeguarded. 5
This is the point where the discussion
should have begun. Due process should
have been defined at this point. The ad hoc
committee failed to define due process here
and throughout the thirty-eight page Report.
The next paragraph declared that most
of the current discussion about due process
is conditioned by Anglo-American common-law tradition. This would suggest that
there is a type of due process which is not
conditioned by the Anglo-American common-law tradition. This, of course, is false.
Due process exists only in Anglo-American law. Due process is not merely conditioned by that tradition; it is an essential
part of it.
The Report continues by saying that the
Anglo-American common-law tradition
"requires, substantively, that no fundamental right or freedom shall be denied
without adequate justification." 6 This
statement is erroneous. No fundamental
right may ever be denied under the law of
the United States. There can be no adequate justification for the denial of a right
in the United States. Under certain circumstances, the exercise of a right may be
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limited provided the requirements of substantive and procedural due process are
observed.
The Report denies the fact that separa7
tion of powers is required by due process.
This is erroneous. The arguments offered by
the Report in support of this position are
irrelevant. Separation of powers is necessary to due process both historically and
logically. Due process requires an independent judiciary. Without separation of
powers there can be no independent judiciary.
RIGHTS AND

AUTHORITY

The Report shows considerable confusion as to the true nature of the fundamental rights of men in relation to the
authority of the Bishop. For example, it
states that "[tihe declaration and protection of fundamental rights . . .isone of
the most important exercises of governmental authority by the Bishop." 8 Protection of fundamental rights is not an exercise of the Bishops' authority at all. In the
area covered by the rights of men, the
Bishops have no authority. Rights are protected by law not by Bishops. Everyone
has a duty to respect the rights of others,
including Bishops.
Consequently, the statement of the
Report-"[ilf they are genuine rights, the
Bishop loses nothing by being required
to respect them" 9-is correct in the sense
that they lose nothing because they have

7

5 Id. at 282.
6 Id.
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Id.

9
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nothing to lose. This statement, however,
is incorrect, because it suggests that the
Bishops are not already required to respect
these rights. This is false. It is not necessary to incorporate due process into the
law of the Church to oblige Bishops to
respect rights. With or without due process, all Bishops, as all men, must respect
rights. This is so because God has given
rights to man to enable him to have the
freedom to fulfill his duties to God. To
violate the rights of man is to intrude upon
the sacred relationship that God has established with man. It is an offense against
God and an injustice to man. All men, particularly, all leaders of men have a duty
to God and man to respect the rights of
man. As a man and as a leader of men,
a Bishop has the same duty. As an Alter
Christus, he has the additional obligation
to follow closely in the footsteps of the
Humble Christ in accordance with his sublime vocation.
In spite of the apparent confusion regarding the nature of rights and authority
as indicated above, the Report shows a
true understanding of the issue when it
declares:
It seems to the members of this Society
that the obedience a Bishop legitimately
expects when he seeks the unity of the
diocesan apostolate never requires a person unwillingly to give up his Christian
rights. 10
It is not clear what the Report means by
"Christian" rights. Man's rights arise from

10 Id. at 285.

his nature, not from his acceptance of
Christianity. The Declaration on Religious
Freedom has reaffirmed this position. No
one should be barred from his natural
rights by reason of rejection of Christianity. Such a course of action would violate
man's religious freedom. Christians and
non-Christians, all men, have natural rights
because these rights arise out of their nature as men. No person should be required
to give up his rights by anyone, least of
all, by Bishops. Actually, a man is not free
to give up his rights because they are not
his to surrender. They are God's rights.
God has given them to man so that he will
be free to fulfill his duties and obligations
to God in accordance with his nature. A
person may refrain from exercising his
rights; he may not, in fact, he cannot surrender them.
The Report is correct in considering
due process an effective way to exercise
authority. It is not accurate to say that due
process is simply one of the effective ways
in which this end is realized. In the law
of the United States, due process is the
only means by which authority may be
exercised legally.
Separation of powers is necessary for
due process. Therefore, when the Bishop
is a party to a dispute in disciplinary matters, he has a duty to refer the dispute to
an impartial board outside of his control.
As the Report has correctly stated, there
is no theological obstacle to such a course
of action. There is, on the other hand, the
very demanding reason of law, separation
of powers in accordance with due process,
for doing so. In addition, such a course of
action frees the Bishop from the possible

16
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cieties labored to build "an effective and
independent system for the protection of
rights," the Church allowed itself to remain at a lower stage in the development
of adequate safeguards for the protection
of human rights."

suspicion of hypocrisy and of subverting
justice.
NEED FOR DUE PROCESS

M

There can be little question of the validity of the Report's position that "the present moment in the history of mankind
imperatively calls for further development
in the recognition of fundamental fairness
in the governmental life of the Church.""
This, of course, can be best accomplished
at least in the United States by the introduction of due process into the law of the
Church. The Report is accurate in declaring that this position is solidly founded
in the teaching of the Second Vatican
Council. The citations from The Declaration on Religious Freedom, which the Report has used in support of its position, are
most apt. As the Report indicated, the
Council referred these statements to civil
society and not to the Church. Nevertheless, the Report is accurate when it says
in reference to these statements that "they
have obvious implications for the Church,
since the Church is and must ever be 'a
sign and a safeguard of the transcendence

of the human person.'

"12

The Report should have declared flatly
that these principles are of universal application. Consequently, they are equally
valid in Church government as in civil
government.
The Report highlights the need for due
process by saying:

Unfortunately, that precisely is what the
Church has done for many centuries. The
Report should have admitted this fact candidly as did the Second Vatican Council
and Pope Paul VI.
The Report has noted with approval the
view of the Vatican Council and then demonstrated the need for canon law due process with the words:
The ferment of the gospel, which is especially active in the Church of our time, is
arousing in the hearts of Christians an irresistible demand that the human dignity
of each member of the faithful should be
recognized and protected by suitable legal
guarantees.14
It would seem that this ferment of the
gospel would be equally active in demanding the protection of the human dignity
through canon law due process as it is in
demanding protection against the state by
suitable legal guarantees.
In the section entitled Governmental
Context, the Report considered the entire
legislative, judicial, and administrative
structure of the Church.' 5 In referring to
adjudication, the Report asserts that the
Church law affirms the availability of a
judicial remedy for the protection of every

It would be unfortunate if, while civil so-

11 Id. at 283.
12

Id. at 284.

Id.
Id.
15 Id. at 286.
13
14
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right in accordance with Canon 1667.16
This is, of course, within the context of the
present Code, which does not recognize
due process. The Report acknowledged the
fact that understaffed tribunals have de
facto limited these rights and that canon
law does not permit judicial review of administrative decisions. Even when such decisions are reviewable by the Roman Congregations, the Report admits that such
review is unsatisfactory because of distance, secrecy, unavailability of evidence,
and "other failures in regard to contemporary standards of fundamental procedural
fairness. '17 This, of course, is a very persuasive argument for establishing canon
law due process.
While asserting that the Code of Canon
Law is not without concern for limiting
administrative discretion, the Report admits that the checks it has established are
minimal and unsuited to present-day jurisprudence. In any event, due process is not
fulfilled, because canon law rules do not
take cognizance of the principle of separation of powers.
The Report is accurate in stating that
"[p]rocedural fairness in all aspects of the
administrative life of the Church is one of
the pressing needs of our time." ' However, as usual it is not complete. Fairness
should be extended to all of the life of the
Church, judicial, executive, legislative as
well as administrative. Due process should
permeate the entire Church. The Report
continues:

I;/d. at 287 & n.23.
Id.
18 Id.
17

[I]ndeed, it is the conviction of the members of this Society that the greatest promise for removing causes of conflict in the
Church lies in the elimination of unnecessary discretionary power in ecclesiastical
administrators, and in the development of
effective guidelines, controls, and checks
upon necessary discretionary power.19
This statement, as well as the entire section
on GovernmentalContext, might be reduced
to simply saying that the Church needs
canon law due process in every type of
administrative and judicial proceeding. The
specific evils referred to in this section are
due to the lack of due process. Consequently, they can easily be remedied by
establishing due process of law in the law
of the Church. It is unfortunate that the
Report did not say so.
With the exception of two paragraphs
20
entitled Judicial Process,
which are not
relevant, the rest of the Report is concerned with conciliation, arbitration, structuring administrative discretion and the
appendices, none of which is due process.
Therefore, with the exception of the last
sentence of the Report, no evaluation of
this material will be made. This sentence
is:
Exceptions to this principle of fundamental
fairness should be extremely rare and only
in the interest of protecting confidentiality
deemed essential to the good order of the
21

ecclesial community.

The mandates of fundamental fairness
which are referred to above are the right

19 Id. at 287-88.
Id. at 291.
2t Id. at 307.
2)
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to notice and right to be heard in administrative proceedings in which rights may
be adversely affected. It is, therefore, incredible that a Report on due process
could end on a note like this suggesting
exceptions to the rules requiring notice
and hearing, two of the most basic concepts of due process. It is even more incredible that any group of Americans,
which includes lawyers, canon lawyers,
and priests, could possibly assert that there
should ever be any exceptions to the basic
rule of justice which requires fundamental
fairness.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST DUE PROCESS

In the section Ecclesiological Implications, the Report examines the issue as to
whether due process has any place in the
Catholic Church.2 2 It is argued that the
American legal concept of separation of
powers would be in conflict with the Catholic doctrine of unity of authority in the
Bishop. Three answers are offered to this
objection.
First, the Report denies that the doctrine
of separation of powers is required by due
process. As was stated before, this view is
erroneous, the arguments offered by the
Report in support of this position are irrelevant.
Second, the Report compares the various procedural protections against the
abuse of authority by Bishops in the present Code of Canon Law to due process:
"All of these are in the nature of procedural limitations upon the Bishop, and yet
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Third, the Report makes a similar contribution to the Church by eliminating the
objection that due process undermines the
Bishop's authority. In so doing, the Report
is inaccurate in saying that " '[dlue process' does place limitations on a Bishop's
exercise of power. '24 As stated previously,
due process only protects rights over which
the Bishop has no authority. The Report
admits this principle and contradicts itself
when it says "the obedience a Bishop legitimately expects when he seeks the unity of
the diocesan apostolate never requires a
person unwillingly to give up his Christian
rights."'2 By this same statement the Report also effectively eliminates the argument that due process violates the obedience due to Bishops. The Report is
correct in asserting that "far from undermining his authority, [due process] does
much to win respect for it, and so enables
him to govern more effectively. '26 This
statement is, of course, true and is a very
convincing argument for due process in
the minds of many, particularly Bishops.
The Report evaluates due process in the
following words:

23 Id. at 283.
25 Id. at 285.

Id. at 282.
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they have been thought to be consistent
with the centralization of all governmental
authority in the local Bishop. '23 This view
is, of course, accurate. By putting to rest
the objection that due process violates the
concept of unity of authority in the Bishop,
the Report has performed a great service
for the Church.

24 Id.

22
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Those securing it, in positions of authority
in the Church, show their love for the People of God, their trust in the working of
the Spirit, and their personal disinterestedness by effectively safeguarding the rights
27
of those entrusted to their care.
This is a high tribute to due process and
to those who seek it. It would appear that
anyone who seeks due process and in that
sense hungers and thirsts after justice in
accordance with the promise of the Beatitude shall be filled, whether they be in
authority or not. In fact, those without
authority would seem to have a greater
reward since they do not have a special
duty by reason of authority to seek it.
Those in authority with a duty to fulfill
their office in justice and love have no
right to do less.
The Report has probably reached its
highest flight of rhetoric and achieved the
summit of its validity as a legal document
with these words:
The characteristics of a free man are precisely that he has rights, that he is not dependent for the enjoyment of his rights
upon the good will of his superiors, and
that his rights are effectively protected so
as to be legally inviolable. The aim of "due
process" is precisely to give such inviola28
bility.
SUMMARY

To sum up, the Report on due process
failed due process because:
1. It did not define it.

27
28

3.

It did not require it in every conciliation, mediation, arbitration, administrative and judicial proceeding in the American Church.

4. It confused due process with participatory government.
5. It equated due process to conciliation, arbitration, and structured administrative proceedings.
6. It claimed that due process does not
require separation of powers.
7. It did not show the true nature of
due process. It made many errors in
statements of law and in the concept
of due process.
8. It suggested that rare exceptions
could be made to the principle of
fundamental fairness, specifically in
the due process requirement of notice and hearing in administrative
proceedings where rights could be
adversely affected.
9. It made many misstatements on the
law of rights, duties, and authority.
It did, however, accomplish much good
for due process by demonstrating that
many arguments offered against it are fallacious. Specifically, the Report has proven
that:
1. Due process is not incompatible with
the principle of unity of authority in
Bishops.

2. It did not demand it in Church Law.

2. Separation of powers is not inconsistent with the principle of unity of
authority in Bishops.

Id. at 286.
Id. at 284.

3. Due process does not violate the
duty of obedience due to Bishops.

16
4. Due process does not undermine the
Bishop's authority.
The Report also proved that:
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6. Participation in the government of
the Church by all its members,
priests, religious, and the laity
should be implemented immediately.

1. Due process enhances the Bishop's
authority by enabling him to govern
more effectively.

The greatest value of this Report, however, is threefold.

2. The need for reform in the Code of
Canon Law is immediate and farreaching.

1. It brought the immediate need for
due process in the Church to the
attention of the NCCB.

3. Administrative authority in
Church should be structured.

2. It was the instrument by which the
NCCB accepted this immediate need
for due process in the Church.

the

4. Effective appeals from administrative decisions should be provided.
5. Conciliation and arbitration proceedings should be incorporated into
Canon Law.

3.

It was the vehicle by which the
NCCB recommended to its membership experimentation with due
process.

